Archive for the ‘economics’ Category

Global Average temperatures to 2008-October

Friday, November 21st, 2008

This is the running twelve month average world temperature, as measured by satellites, as reported by The National Space Science and Technology Center.

World temperature change in centigrade degrees.
Global temperature change in degrees centigrade to 2008 October

It goes up, it goes down. If there is any trend, the trend is less than the decade to decade fluctuations, and is not at all apocalyptic. This differs from other graphs you may have seen because it starts at the start of the satellite data and ends at the present, instead of starting in with a reconstruction of what might have been a cool year if we had accurate global data way back then, which we don’t, and ending in 2005, the most recent warm year.

Similarly for the amount of ocean ice

Again, it goes up, it goes down. If there is any trend, the trend is less than the decade to decade fluctuations, and is not at all apocalyptic. Again this differs from similar graphs you may have seen, which usually start in 1988 (a year with exceptionally large ice area) and end in 2007 (a year with exceptionally small ice area), and show only the Northern Hemisphere, where we recently had some exceptionally warm years, leaving out the Southern Hemisphere, where we recently had some exceptionally cold years.

As you can see, nothing much is happening – looks like the world is warming, but not enough to be noticeable – nor enough to be sure that it actually is warming.

Thus irrespective of the validity of anthropogenic global warming, the belief that apocalypse is upon us, that something urgent must be done, is religious, based on the feeling that we have sinned against Gaea and her wrath will come upon us, not based on any scientific evidence.

Why iceland went bust – and why the US went bust

Monday, November 17th, 2008

The usual answer, of course, is the evils of capitalism:

this country’s banks – virtually unregulated – to borrow more than 10 times their country’s gross domestic product from the international wholesale money markets. Watch as a Graf Zeppelin of debt propels its self-styled “Viking Raiders” across the world’s financial stage, accumulating companies like gamblers hoarding chips.

In fact, of course, the government regulators made lots of easy money available to ordinary Icelanders. 100% down no deposit, with easy payments – payments that failed to cover the interest, so that the debt grows every year. This was worse than the the loans that the US regulators made available to Hispanics – the Hispanics got no money down loans, but their payments had to cover the interest, plus the Icelandic loans were for everyone, while the US easy money loans were mostly to favored voting blocks.  Most US loans were not negative amortization, while all Icelandic loans were “indexed” – the equivalent of negative amortization.

The Financial Times reports

Easy access to 100% mortgages …

Iceland is the only country in the world that indexes its loans in addition to charging interest. This means that when Icelanders borrow IKr1,000 from the bank and inflation increases by 5 per cent, the bank increases their debt to IKr1,050 at the end of the year. A great deal for the bank and fine for you, too – so long as the property’s value and your salary are increasing by inflation and more.

The collapse of Iceland illustrates the “Micawber Principle”

Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.

Around the world, politicians promised voters they could live above their means, and created the pretense that it could be done.  And now the bill is due.  The bust is worse in Iceland, because the lie was bigger.

China’s boom

Wednesday, November 12th, 2008

China in the 20th century had two major revolutions, a civil war, a World War, The Great Leap Forward [sic], mass starvation, the Cultural Revolution, arguably the most tyrannical dictator ever and he didn’t even brush his teeth, and now they are going from rags to riches without even a business cycle burp.  While the world plunges into major recession, China is suffering a barely noticeable hiccup, and has become the locomotive that is pulling the rest of the world out recession.

How so?

I say it is Cypherpunk economics.  The Chinese economy, the non state part of the economy, is run by overseas Chinese through vpns from servers located in tax havens.  And so long as China does not kill the golden goose by blocking those vpns at the great firewall of China, I predict that its economy will go from strength to strength.

How many CRA loans, how much affirmative action payout?

Wednesday, November 5th, 2008

From 2000 to 2007, blacks and hispanics received six hundred and thirteen billion dollars more in home purchase mortgages than they would have received had they received the same proportion of the money that they received in 1999 – a figure that strikingly resembles the total cost of the bailout.

In 1999, people warned that CRA loans, affirmative action loans, racial quota loans, began to endanger the financial system

Fannie Mae, the nation’s biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people …

…These borrowers whose incomes, credit ratings and savings are not good enough to qualify for conventional loans, …

… “If they fail, the government will have to step up and bail them out the way it stepped up and bailed out the thrift industry.”

1977 was the start of turning the finance industry into a political slush fund, and with each regulatory  intervention, the amount of money at risk increased  exponentially

How many CRA loans, affirmative actions loans, racial quota loans, were there?

Fortunately the data for new house loans by race is available, and from this data we can calculate that CRA loans, affirmative action loans, racial quota loans, for new house purchases, in the period 2000 to 2007 were at least  six hundred and thirteen billion dollars, which is pretty close to the total US bailout cost.

613 billion dollars.

So this was an affirmative action financial crisis, and we are for the most part bailing out financial institutions that were forced to lend to unqualified borrowers by race, and perhaps also bailing out the culture of corruption that results from rating mortgage securities AAA that were generated in the course of signing up people to vote democrat with a bottle of cheap whiskey and a million dollar mortgage – because rating them differently would be racist, much as Princeton was corrupted because when it graduated Obama’s wife, fearing that it would have been racist had it failed to pass her thesis merely because it was a barely literate rant against racism.  We are required to pretend Obama’s wife is educated, and we are required to pretend that these borrowers are credit worthy.  It corrupts the universities, and it corrupts the financiers.

There was a massive increase in the value of loans to black and hispanic borrowers.  To the extent that these loans grew much faster than loans to white people, this most likely represents affirmative action.  This is a conservative estimate, since affirmative action lending has been enforced by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) since 1977.  What was new in 1999 was not affirmative action lending, it was affirmative aciton lending on a scale that threatened the financial system.

In 1999, mortgages to black and hispanic new house borrowers were 10.4% of mortgages to white new house borrowers.

In 2006, mortgages to black and hispanic new house borrowers were 36.5% of mortgages to white new house borrowers.

I calculate what new home mortgages would have been had new home mortgages to black and hispanics remained 10.4% of new home mortgages to whites.

The excess, the difference between hypothetical mortgages and actual mortgages, is a conservative estimate of CRA loans, affirmative action loans, racial quota loans.

In this table, the first column is new housing loans to whites, the second column is new housing loans to blacks and hispanics. Estimated CRA loans are the difference between the actual and hypothetical loans, and at the bottom I total numbers.

The numbers for new house mortgages in billions of dollars come the government racial quota monitoring website.  The number for affirmative action loans is my estimate, calculated as new house mortgages to blacks and hispanics minus 10.4% of white new house mortgages

The numbers for new house mortgages in billions of dollars come the government racial quota monitoring website.  The value for affirmative action loans is my estimate, calculated as new house mortgages to
blacks and hispanics minus 10.4% of white new house mortgages

Home Purchase Mortgages in Billions of dollars

Year Black and
Hispanic
White estimated
CRA
1999 37.60 359.90 0.00
2000 43.72 364.54 5.63
2001 51.18 381.41 11.33
2002 89.44 469.03 40.44
2003 128.40 537.96 72.20
2004 135.26 547.41 78.07
2005 236.06 757.33 156.94
2006 247.55 678.20 176.70
2007 129.53 547.41 72.34
Total 1098.75 4643.20 613.65

Unfortunately, no racial breakdown on default rate is available, but the Hispanics I saw buying houses in Sunnyvale in 2005 and 2006, looking at them from twenty paces, you could tell in two heartbeats that the chances of them making payments was very poor indeed.

Implicit government guarantees produce a vast river of easy credit to the too-big-to-fail beneficiary of that guarantee, and inevitably politicians are tempted to direct that river to political voting blocks – sometimes political voting blocks that are unlikely to repay the money.

It is a fundamental moral hazard problem in government regulation and intervention, which cannot be regulated away.  Instead of regulating, the beneficiaries of these guarantees must be shrunk – regulated to become small enough to fail, instead of regulated to benevolently hand out money to the politically favored.  Instead of sending that mighty river of money in the direction of desirable voting blocks, politicians must shrink it – which, like dieting, is hard for them to do.

The financial crisis in America was one of affirmative action and the community reinvestment act, of Black and Hispanic deadbeats robbing honest hardworking whites, but thinking of it in those terms of the particular voting blocks is not useful, will not get us to a financial system that moves savings from honest thrifty savers to honest hard working investors who can put the money to profitable use.  Such thinking, thinking in terms of voting blocks, will at best merely change the skin color of the deadbeats robbing the honest folk.  The financial crisis in the rest of the world had different beneficiaries with diverse skin colors, but the common factor was political favor sending funds to political voting blocks, rather than to people able to put the money to profitable use.  It is more useful to think in terms of moral hazard – that politicians cannot regulate, for they have perverse and dangerous incentives, and therefore corrupt financiers.

That politicians dispatched our money to cat eating wetbacks should enrage us, but we should be enraged at the politicians, rather than at migrants looking for work who have difficulty affording meat from a butcher, migrants who are prohibited from honest work by those politicians, and then offered welfare and a million dollar mortgage no money down by the same politicians.  The politicians corrupted Hispanics and financiers alike.

The crisis in unregulated financial markets

Friday, October 31st, 2008

Observe that the unregulated Credit Default Swap market is now working just fine, despite handling gigantic money flows, such as the failure of the Icelandic banks, that shake other markets, despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that more highly regulated markets have frozen up.

What went wrong in a short while ago in unregulated markets was that  people in an unregulated market would look at a highly regulated participant in that unregulated market, such as AIG, and say “AAA rating, implicit government guarantee, and everything they do is examined by the regulators every month, obviously we can trust them completely”, and it turned out they could not.

Now that the assumption is that anything the regulators have a finger in is probably criminal, the unregulated credit default swap market is working fine.

As regulated financial markets have frozen up, the shadow banking system has taken up the slack.  As regulators reach out to grasp the shadow banking system, it will no doubt swiftly become more shadowy.

The cause of the subprime crisis

Monday, October 20th, 2008

The subprime crisis was caused by regulation and the expectation that some companies were too big to fail – that if those companies got in trouble, the government would make sure their debtors were paid.

What did regulation tell financiers about subprime loans? It told them they had better make subprime loans, or face a lawsuit by ACORN, a lawsuit in which the regulators made it clear they would be backing ACORN.

Ted Day tells us what regulation said

The Boston Fed, speaking for the entire fed, declared in 1992 “discrimination may be observed when a lender’s underwriting policies contain arbitrary or outdated criteria that effectively disqualify many urban or lower-income minority applicants.”

Some of these “outdated” criteria included the size of the mortgage payment relative to income, credit history, savings history and income verification. Instead, the Boston Fed ruled that participation in a credit-counseling program should be taken as evidence of an applicant’s ability to manage debt.

So yes, starting in 1992, the regulators COMPELLED financiers to make these toxic loans that sunk the world’s financial system.

Indeed, this is natural and predicable, it is inevitable that regulation will always be counterproductive, will always have the opposite effect to that intended, for government regulators have no incentive to be prudent, whereas lenders do have an incentive to be prudent – unless they are lending to a firm that is too big to fail.

If a firm is too big to fail, people will lend it money, knowing the government will ensure they get paid back. So the too big to fail business borrows unreasonably large amounts of money, and lends it in unreasonably risky ventures – if things go well, the too big to fail business pocket the profit, if things go badly, someone else (usually the taxpayer), loses the cash, heads I win, tails someone else loses.

So the government has to regulate too big to fail businesses to restrain them from taking excessive risks – but such regulation is always politically unpopular, for it invariably means that people who “need” credit don’t get loans, and instead loans go to people who don’t need them – that loans go to people with plenty of assets and a history of using money profitably and paying their debts as and when they fall due, which people are seldom popular – goes to wealthy Jews instead of poor blacks, goes to the financially prudent instead of the politically connected, goes to the industrious and thrifty instead of ward heelers who get out the vote. So in practice, regulation aways works the other way around – encouraging or compelling too big to fail businesses to take excessive risks, rather than restraining them from taking excessive risk.

As it did this time.

The more government is involved in business, the bigger the losses are, and because government is more involved in business that it was, the losses were bigger this time.

The cause of the crisis

Saturday, October 11th, 2008

The bailout will fail.

If the government offers implicit or expicit debt guarantees, if a firm is “too big to fail, then that firm can easily borrow lots of money cheaply, and lend that money to people not so guaranteed at a higher interest rate.

Free Money!

The too big to fail firm is going to take absurd risks that no one would ever take with their own money. And if trouble ensues, then they have less to lose, in proportion as the taxpayer has more to lose, so they will bet even bigger.

To prevent this, the government regulates these “too big to fail” entities, prohibiting them from taking excessive risks.

Regulation failed in three ways:

  1. Gaming the rules by financiers: The government felt that judgments of character, competence, and credit worthiness were too subjective, so wanted risk evaluated by the numbers. But you cannot evaluate risk by the numbers! So the numbers were gamed, and loans to reckless people of bad character were rearranged to as to have wonderfully low risk numbers.
  2. Political correctness by government: The government and various interest groups noticed that when borrowers were evaluated by credit worthiness, character, and competence in managing money, most people with good scores were white. So they pressured financiers to abandon these criteria, and regulated them to make loans that required them to abandon these criteria – and since the financiers were too big to fail, they were willing to comply.
  3. Loss of contact with reality by accountants: Accountants, both by natural inclination, and because they were compelled by Sarbannes Oxley regulation, focused on the numbers, forgetting what the numbers actually stood for. When the unreality of the numbers was revealed, the entire financial sector became paralyzed. They are in the dark, and there is no source of light proposed

The bailout is an effort to keep business as usual going – but business as usual was not working, failed, failed catastrophically. We need a new finance sector, a main street finance sector where local bank branches ledn to to local people on the basis of character and solvency. Most of the wall street finance sector which the bailout is intended to keep alive needs to be shut down, to permanently go out of business, and despite massive cash injections, it simply is not in business right now. It remains paralyzed, despite gigantic handouts of cash, because they are aware that if they were to resume business as usual, they would piss away the new money in the same way they pissed away the old money.

The cause of the crisis

Monday, October 6th, 2008

If a company is too big to fail, then people will take risks they would not otherwise take.  “Too big to fail” is an implicit subsidy for taking big risks – which results in people taking big risks. So we have just paid people seven hundred billion dollars for taking stupidly big risks. What do you think is going to happen?

What the bailout does to capitalism and the dollar

Friday, October 3rd, 2008

As we have seen, organizations that are too big to fail, fail big.  The US government is the biggest of them all.

For credit to work, people who need credit should not get credit.  You should only be able to get credit if you can prove you do not need it.  The major purpose of the bailout is to ensure that people who need credit will continue to get it.

For capitalism to work, to produce good results, rich people have to be smart.  Therefore stupid and greedy rich people need to be swiftly separated from their money.  As recent events demonstrate, the financial sector is dominated by stupid greedy rich people.  One major purpose and intent of the bailout is to prevent them from becoming stupid greedy poor people.

But if stupid greedy rich people continue to run the financial system, and the financial system continues to make credit available to those that need credit, rather than those that are most likely to be able and willing to pay their just debts as and when those debts fall due, then we are going to have more and bigger financial crises like the one we just had.

“Too big to fail” results in everyone putting their wealth in the hands of organizations that are too big to fail – which as we have seen are generally run by morons, resulting in bigger failures.  Eventually, most wealth will be in the hands of the biggest organization of them all, the US government, which is run by the most stupid morons of them all.  And then that too will fail.  The day will come when you  will get paid in nice crisp dollar bills, but they will not be worth much.  This has been the most expensive financial crisis in history.  If the bailout goes through, expect the ultimate financial crisis, when the US government itself goes broke, around 2020 or so.

Wall Street Journal explains the bailout crisis

Thursday, September 25th, 2008

Wall street journal reports that this crisis was the predicted result of politically correct lending policies commanded by the Clinton administration, continued and worsened by the Bush administration.

Carpe Diem reports that this crisis was predicted when these policies were introduced by the Clinton Administration.  In 1999, the NY Times observed:

Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic times. But the government-subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a government rescue similar to that of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s

Which is, of course, what happened.